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NOTES
Nonrecognition of the Independence of Transkei
O N OCTOBER 26, 1976, Paramount Chief Kaiser Daliwonga
Matanzima declared Transkei' an independent state. Normally the
Third World and the West would have welcomed the independence of
another black African state but in this case they did not, for Transkei
was the first of the Republic of South Africa's black "homelands" to
receive independence under that government's multinational develop-
ment policy. The Republic was the only state to send diplomatic
representatives to the Transkeian independence celebrations and so far
has been the only state to recognize the new entity.
Transkei is one of nine homelands" set aside by the South African
government as the national territory for the tribal groups present in
the Republic.2 Its population includes several tribes which share a
common background, the Xhosas being the predominant component.
Consisting of three blocks of territory with a combined surface area
about the size of Switzerland, Transkei is located in south-central
South Africa, with 270 miles of coastline on the Indian Ocean. It
shares a common border with Lesotho.3
This note will examine the background of the independence move-
ment in Transkei and explore the use of nonrecognition as an ap-
propriate response by the international community and its effect on
South Africa's homeland strategy.
THE NATIONAL PARTY'S BANTU POLICY
As soon as the ruling National Party gained control of the South
African Parliament in 1948, it began implementation of its apartheid
(separate development) policy. 4 A party pamphlet issued before the
election set out the basic terms of that policy:
'On Transkei see generally P. LAURENCE, THE TRANSKEI: SOUTH AFRICA'S
POLITICS OF PARTITION (1976); B. ROGERS, DIVIDE AND RULE: SOUTH AFRICA'S BAN-
TUSTANS (1976); and Note, The Transkei: South Africa's Illegitimate Child, 12 NEw
ENGLAND L. REV. 585 (1977).
2The eight other homelands and their tribal identities are: Bophuthatswana
(Twsana), Ciskei (Xhosa), Gazankulu (Tsonga/Shangaan), KwaZulu (Zulu), Lebowa
(North Sotho), Qwaqwa (South Sotho), Swazi (Swazi), and Venda (Venda). A tenth
homeland is planned for the South Ndebele people.
3Backgrounder: Transkei Independence, South African Embassy, Wash., D.C.,
Sept. 1976, at 2.
4The Republic of South Africa uses the term "multinational development" for its
policy of separation along racial and cultural lines. An official explanation of the
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In general terms our policy envisages the most important ethnic
groups and sub-groups in their own areas where every group will be
enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit.
We endorse the general principle of territorial segregation of the
Bantu and the Whites ....
The reserves should be the national home of the Bantu.5
In 1955 the report of the Tomilison Commission became available.
Commissioned by the South African government to recommend the
way in which its native policy should be implemented, the Commission
advised that the African reserves be consolidated into seven ethnic
blocks and further developed.' Integration was rejected.7 Up to this
point attempts had been made to establish specific territory for
development into self-governing'reserves for the ethnic groups, but no
official had proposed the creation of independent states for the black
groups as a solution to the race problem. In 1959, however, Dr. Ver-
woerd and the National Party reversed their position and enacted the
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act.' The Act set up machinery
for the creation of national homelands for Africans with the eventual
goal of self-government and independence. It was made clear in the
preamble of the Act that the government considered the African tribes
as separate units.
In 1963 Transkei became the first black homeland to establish ter-
ritorial authority and create a legislative assembly. Its constitution pro-
vided for a unicameral legislative assembly with limited powers to
repeal South African legislation in force in the territory.9
Passage of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act in 197110
facilitated the creation of other self-governing homelands. The Act
empowered the President of the Republic of South Africa to form a
policy can be found in SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMATION SERVICE, SOUTH AFRICA: 1976
at 196-222 (1976).
"Quoted in Jacobs, Hazards of Homeland Policy, in SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE:
CONTRASTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING ON BASIC RACE ISSUES 153 (N. Rhoodie ed.
1972). South African blacks now regard the term "Bantu" as derogatory.
6When the Nationalists came to power in 1948, the tribal territories consisted of
260 separate areas. There are now plans to consolidate the present areas into 36
blocks.
7UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT OF THE ToMILISON COMMISSION ON THE
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANTU AREAS, UG 61/1955, 180-83 (1955).
8Act 46 of 1959.
gTranskei Constitution Act, Act 48 of 1963.
1
eAct 21 of 1971.
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legislative assembly for the seven ethnic areas, in addition to Transkei,
where the tribal groups were concentrated. By 1972 legislative
assemblies had been established for seven ethnic groups." The 1971
Act also provided for the South African President to declare a territory
"self-governing,"' 2 along the Transkeian model, with an executive
council and an assembly with the power to repeal or amend acts of the
South African Parliament.13 The preamble of the Bantu Homelands
Constitution Act affirmed the intention of the government to lead each
ethnic African group to self-government and independence. Rather
than enact separate legislation for each area as had been done for
Transkei in 1963, the 1971 Act applied to all homeland territories.
Chapter I of the Act provided for the establishment of legislative
assemblies to replace the territorial authorities; Chapter II dealt with
the self-governing stage. Certain matters, however, would not be
transferred to the legislative assemblies at the self-governing stage.
These included defense, postal service, customs, banking, the conduct
of foreign affairs, and various police functions.
Earlier legislation, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970,14
had provided that every African in South Africa who was not already a
citizen of a self-governing territory would become one, although he
would retain South African citizenship for international purposes.'"
The goal of this citizenship provision and the development of the
homelands was to force all blacks in the Republic to become citizens of
the homelands, either de facto because they resided in the area, or de
jure because of some cultural or blood tie to the ethnic group residing
in the homeland. In this way blacks could be effectively removed from
participation in South African political life, while at the same time
they could be available as a cheap source of labor for the South
African economy, in many cases actually living around white urban
areas.
TRANSKEIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Under the Transkei Constitution Act of 196316 Transkei became a
"Tswana (Apr. 30, 1971); Ciskei (May 21, 1971); Venda (May 21, 1971);
Gazankulu (June 25, 1971); Lebowa (June 30, 1971); Qwaqwa (Oct. 1, 1971); and
KwaZulu (March 30, 1972).
"Act 21 of 1971, § 26.
"Ild. § 18.
14Act 26 of 1970.
"Id. §§ 2(3) & (4).
"6Act 48 of 1963.
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separate territory for the Xhosa people,' 7 while certain towns and areas
in which whites lived within the territory remained under the control
of Cape Province. All blacks who were born in Transkei or who had
lived in the territory for five years became citizens. Additionally, any
member of a tribal group residing in Transkei, though living else-
where, was considered a citizen of Transkei. Thus, for example, a
Xhosa living in Soweto whose family had not lived in Transkei for
many years, would nevertheless become a citizen of Transkei.
A Legislative Assembly was created, consisting of 64 chiefs and 45
elected members.' 8 The Assembly could exercise some powers such as
taxation and control over agriculture, but the South African Parlia-
ment retained authority over defense, security, railways, banking,
hospitals, and certain other important functions. Gradually more
aspects of public functions were turned over to the Transkeian
legislature.' 9 Executive authority resided in a cabinet chosen by the
Chief Minister, who was elected by the Assembly. All citizens over
twenty years of age were enfranchised and elections were to be held
every five years.
In 1963 the first of these planned elections was held. At that time
there were no political parties in Transkei and the contest for the 45
elective seats in the Legislative Assembly revolved around two groups.
Chief Mantanzima, who ultimately became Chief Minister and is the
present Prime Minister of Transkei, led one faction; Paramount Chief
Poto headed the other. 20 Matanzima's group formed the nucleus of the
Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), advocating' separate
and independent development for Transkei, while Poto's faction later
formed the Democratic Party (DP), contending that the territory
should remain part of a multiracial South Africa. Between thirty and
thirty-eight 2' of Poto's supporters were elected to the contested seats in
the Assembly in 1963. Chief Matanzima nevertheless became Chief
1In addition to Transkei the Xhosa-speaking people have the homeland of
Ciskei, with a population of 1,760,000 (1970 census).
"The paramount chiefs held their seats indefinitely; the other chiefs were at first
appointed, but under a 1967 amendment to the Act were elected from and by the
chiefs themselves.
"9For example, under the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 23 of 1972, Trans-
kei received control of prisons and transportation regulations; the 1972 General Law
Amendment Act, No. 102 of 1972, authorized the transfer of police control.
"0For an analysis of this and other Transkeian elections, see Williams, Transkeian
Elections, in A. LEMON, APARTHEID 208-13 (1976).
2Id. at 212; P. LAURENCE, supra note 1, at 69.
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Minister, largely because of his support among the sixty-four chiefs
who were members of the legislature ex officio.
The issues remained essentially the same in the 1968 Transkei elec-
tions. This time the TNIP won a clear victory, taking twenty-eight of
the Assembly seats compared to the DP's fourteen; three seats went to
independents.22 Moreover, Matanzima and the TNIP retained the sup-
port of the chiefs in the Assembly, thus giving the Chief and his party
clear control of the government. The TNIP made further gains in the
1973 elections, where the only issue was Transkeian independence.
Again, TNIP dominance was obvious; the party won twenty-six seats,
the Democratic Party eleven, and independents eight. To the extent
that the elections represented the preference of the people of the
homeland, the results gave a strong mandate to the TNIP to seek in-
dependence from Pretoria.
The South African government supported the independence move-
ment in Transkei and looked favorably on the TNIP's success, for
Transkeian independence was compatible with its own policies of
multinational development. No doubt this support was helpful to the
TNIP, especially in influencing the chiefs in the Assembly who received
payments from the South African government. Still, the success of
Matanzima and his party can also be attributed to a growing accept-
ance of the policy of independence by Transkeian people, and to the
economic growth in the homeland during the TNIP's rule.23
The TNIP goal of an independent Transkei reached fruition on
October 26, 1976. On June 11 of that year the South African Parlia-
ment, controlled by the National Party, enacted the Status of Transkei
Act2 4 over the opposition of the United and Progressive Reform Par-
ties.25 Under this Act full sovereignty and legislative competence was
transferred to the Umtata legislature. Provision was made for the crea-
tion of a Transkei constitution, making the homeland an independent
state, separate from the Republic of South Africa. Laws in force in
Transkei before independence would remain in force unless repealed
22In addition to the independents, a third party, the Transkei People's Freedom
Party, existed for a short time.
13It should be noted that the South African government subsidized the Trans-
keian economy heavily during this period.
"4Act 100 of 1976.
"The United Party opposed an independent Transkei, while the Progressive
Reform Party believed that the homelands should become self-governing provinces
within a South African federation.
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or amended by the new state's legislature, now called the National
Assembly.
Long, heated debate took place in the South African Parliament
during the three readings Of the Status of Transkei bill. Both opposi-
tion parties maintained that the solution to the country's racial prob-
lems should be found within the totality of South Africa. They pointed
out that no referenda had ever been held on independence for Trans-
kei either in that territory or in the Republic, and that the problem of
citizenship in the new state had not been resolved. Typical of this
reasoning was the remark of Sir De Villiers Graaff (United Party), who
said of the Act, "It heralds the first stage of the Nationalist Govern-
ment's long-term policy of seeking to solve the problems of our plural
society by what I would describe as systematic abdications of sovereign-
ty over large portions of our common fatherland.12 6
THE CITIZENSHIP CONTROVERSY
A major conflict arose, and continues to exist, between the Na-
tionalist government and Chief Matanzima on the issue of Transkeian
citizenship. The Status of Transkei Act's definition of citizenship is
based on the provisions of the 1963 Transkei Constitution Act.2 7 Essen-
tially this South African legislation extends citizenship not only to all
blacks residing in Transkei, but also to all persons living in South
Africa who are culturally or otherwise related to the tribes living in
Transkei. 2s All Xhosa-speaking persons in the Republic of South
2619 SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, June 7, 1976, at col. 8534.
2'Act 48 of 1963, § 7(2).
28Specifically Schedule B of the 1976 Act provides:
Categories of persons who in terms of section 6 are citizens of the Trans-
kei and cease to be South African citizens:
(a) Every person who was a citizen of the Transkei in terms of any law at
the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in the Transkei of parents one or both of whom were
citizens of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(c) every person born outside the Transkei whose father was a citizen of the
Transkei at the time of his birth;
(d) every person born out of wedlock (according to custom or otherwise) and
outside the Transkei whose mother was a citizen of the Transkei at the
time of his birth;
(e) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the Transkei for a
period of at least five years, irrespective of whether or not such period
[Vol. 10:167
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Africa (except those associated with Ciskei), as well as Sotho-speaking
persons related to the Sotho tribes resident in Transkei would cease to
be citizens of South Africa upon the independence of Transkei. A
board established by the two governments would decide borderline
cases of citizenship. 29 The impact of these citizenship provisions is that
the vast majority of Transkei citizens living outside the territory, about
1.3 million persons (1970 census), would automatically lose their South
African citizenship without being given a choice in the matter. South
Africa had previously encouraged blacks to become citizens of Transkei
or one of the other homelands by giving certain preferential treatment
in employment, home ownership rights, and professional licensing to
those persons who did become homeland citizens. Those who did not
become citizens were denied rights.3 0
Chief Matanzima said that he would not accept these citizenship
provisions as they related to persons living outside of Transkei. He
maintained that the Status of Transkei Act of the South African
Parliament made citizenship optional for those people.3" The Chief
believed that Transkei should not be responsible for the blacks of
Transkeian origin living in South Africa, and that few of them would
choose to return to Transkei after independence. 2
Opposition leaders in Transkei, as well as the opposition parties in
the South African legislature, rejected the proposed citizenship provi-
sions. Two leaders of the Transkeian Democratic Party had planned to
includes any period prior to the commencement of this Act, and, on ap-
plication in the prescribed manner, has been granted citizenship of the
Transkei by the competent authority in the Transkei;
(f) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the
Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of the Transkei in terms of
paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), and speaks a language used by the
Xhosa or Sotho speaking section of the population of the Transkei, in-
cluding any dialect of any such language;
(g) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory within the
Republic of South Africa, and is not a citizen of the Transkei in terms of
paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f), and who is related to any
member of the population contemplated in paragraph (f) or has iden-
tified himself with any part of such population or is culturally or other-
wise associated with any member or part of such population.
"Act 100 of 1976, § 6(2).
3°SouTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS
IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1976, at 231-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RACE SURVEY].
"Id. at 237.
12Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 29, col. 3.
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introduce legislation in the National Assembly of Transkei to the effect
that the homeland not accept independence until Pretoria had given
all Transkeians living in the white urban areas the option of keeping
their South African citizenship.33 The Matanzima government detained
these men before the legislative session began and their motion was
never made.34
On May 18, 1976, the Legislative Assembly did amend provisions
in the Transkei's Republic of Transkei Constitution Act. These amend-
ments were not substantial, and the principal difference between the
Transkeian Act, as amended, and the South African Status of Trans-
kei Act, was the respective treatment of citizenship in borderline
cases."s Under both Acts almost all blacks of Transkeian origin would
lose their South African citizenship and become Transkeian citizens
automatically. 6 Chief Matanzima, nevertheless continued to insist that
'
3 RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 236.
"
4See note 49 infra.
31RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 235.
3 Section 57 of Transkei's Constitution Act sets out the provisions for citizenship:
These shall become a citizen of Transkei
(a) at the commencement of this Act
(i) every person who, having been born in any district of the former
Transkeian Territories or the former territory of the Transkei, is
immediately prior to such commencement, a citizen of that terri-
tory;
(ii) every person born outside the districts of the former Transkeian
Territories or former territory of the Transkei who is immediately
prior to the commencement of this Act a citizen of that territory
and whose father is, or but for his death would have been, a
citizen of Transkei in terms of subparagraph (i);
(iii) every other person who, immediately prior to such commence-
ment, is a citizen of the former territory of the Transkei and has
not lost or renounced such citizenship;
(b) with effect from the date of his birth every person born in Transkei
on or after the date of commencement of this Act: Provided that no
person shall become a citizen of Transkei, by virtue of the provisions of
this paragraph, if at the time of this birth
(i) his father was a person enjoying diplomatic immunity in Transkei
under any law and was not a citizen of Transkei and his mother
was not a citizen of Transkei;
(ii) his father was a citizen of a country with which Transkei was at
war and the birth occurred at a place under the occupation by
the enemy and his mother was not a citizen of Transkei;
(iii) his father was a citizen of a country with which Transkei was at
[Vol. 10:167
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Transkeian citizenship remained optional for persons living outside the
territory.7
The South African government made conflicting comments of the
citizenship legislation, further confusing the issue. At one time M.C.
Botha, South African Minister of Bantu Administration, said that
there was no real citizenship disagreement between the two govern-
ments. Later he stated that if Transkei refused to grant citizenship to
the Africans living in South Africa, they would become stateless per-
sons by the acts of Umtata, not Pretoria.38
The disagreement over the interpretation of the citizenship provi-
sions notwithstanding, the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act' 9 was
signed by both governments on October 26, 1976. A temporary solu-
tion to the problem was reached by allowing the 1.3 million Xhosa liv-
ing in the urban areas of South Africa to retain their South African
citizenship for a two-year period. 40 At the end of this time, however,
those Africans of Transkeian origin who wanted to remain in South
war, had no right of permanent residence in Transkei and was in-
terned or detained in custody and his mother was not a citizen of
Transkei;
(iv) his father was a prohibited immigrant or had no right of perma-
nent residence in Transkei and his mother was not a citizen of
Transkei;
(c) with effect from the date his birth, every person born outside Trans-
kei on or after the date of commencement of this Act whose father
was at the time of the birth a citizen of Transkei: Provided that a per-
son shall not become a citizen of Transkei by virtue of the provisions of
this paragraph if at the time of his birth he becomes a citizen of any
other country;
(d) any person born outside Transkei on or after the date of commence-
ment of this Act if in accordance with law (including customary law) he
is adopted by or otherwise becomes the child of a citizen of Transkei
and his birth is, within two years thereof or with the permission of the
Minister of the Interior or other competent Minister at a later date,
registered with a registering authority of the government of Transkei.
"RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 237.
"For a more extreme statement on citizenship consider the comment of Hugh H.
de Villiers, Information Attache of the South African Embassy in Washington. "Trans-
keians living and working in the Republic of South Africa will not 'lose their South
African citizenship' because they never enjoyed South African citizenship." Christian
Science Monitor, Nov. 5, 1976, at 31, col. 3 (letter to the editor).
"The text of the Draft Bill appeared in Special Gazette No. 1 of Apr. 23, 1976
of the Transkeian government, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1136 (1976).
4 0Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
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Africa would have to obtain Transkeian identity documents. In spite of
the two-year grace period provision, Pretoria later announced that if a
Transkeian living in South Africa visited Transkei, upon re-entry to
South Africa he would have to produce documents from the Trans-
keian authorities that are only given to Transkeian citizens or those
who have applied for citizenship.4 1
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Under the new constitution Transkei became an independent
republic with a non-executive president as head of state.4 2 The Na-
tional Assembly membership increased to 150, 75 members elected by
universal sufferage of all citizens over twenty-five (eighteen if tax-
payers), and 75 members ex officio (70 chiefs and 5 paramount
chiefs). 43 All powers, authority, and functions previously exercised by
the South African President were transferred to the President of
Transkei. 4 4 Prime Minister Matanzima noted that many South African
laws would remain in force in Transkei, even though they were subject
to repeal or amendment by the Assembly. Among the laws that the
government chose to retain were those giving it strong police powers
,and control over dissent: the Immorality Act, ' s the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act, 46 the Terrorism Act, ' 7 the Suppression of Communism
Act, '4 and Proclamation R400. 49
A series of treaties and agreements were concluded between Um-
41RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 244-45.
42TRANSKEI CONST. §§ 1 & 2.
'
31d. § 22.
"4Id. § 4(a).
45Act 23 of 1957. George Matanzima, brother of the Prime Minister, later in-
dicated that the Immorality Act would be repealed in Transkei. Johannesburg Star,
Oct. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 9.
"6Act 55 of 1949.
41Act 83 of 1967. This Act contains especially harsh measures for control by the
government. For example, it shifts the burden of proof to any person found with an
unauthorized weapon to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend to use
the weapon for a disorderly act. Id. § 2(c).
"8Act 44 of 1950.
"This state of emergency proclamation was issued on November 30, 1969, after
the Pondoland disturbances and has remained in force ever since. See KEESING'S CON-
TEMP. ARCHIVES, Oct. 7-14, 1961, at 18367. The proclamation authorizes police and
army officers to arrest persons without a warrant, gives chiefs the right to banish any
tribesman from any tribal area, authorizes restrictions on travel and the right to
assembly, and gives the government detention powers. Chief Matanzima has on several
occasions employed R400 to detain and silence political opposition in Transkei.
[Vol. 10:167
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tata and Pretoria including a non-agression pact,50 under which the
two states agreed not to use armed force against the territorial
sovereignty and political independence of the other; they further
agreed that their respective territories would not be used for military
or subversive actions against the other. Other agreements allowed
Transkei to remain in the rand monetary unit, and made provision for
customs, including application for membership in the South African
Customs Union (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland). 5
Citizens of the two states will have to produce proper identity
documents when entering the other state; only specific ports of entry
can be used.
REACTION TO INDEPENDENCE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA
In the absence of a referendum on independence it is difficult to
tell how many Transkeians living both within the territory and in
South Africa really favored the separation. General elections held just
prior to independence, on September 29, 1976, resulted in an over-
whelming victory for the TNIP and Chief Matanzima. The party was
assured of the support of 72 of the 75 chiefs in the National Assembly,
and took 69 of the 75 elected seats. A Democratic Party secessionist
faction, which supported the TNIP independence policy, won two of
the six remaining seats.
This endorsement of independence is less convincing than it ap-
pears. In the first place, only 43.45% of the electorate voted in the
election.52 More importantly, the Transkeian government emasculated
the opposition Democratic Party, which had favored an undivided,
democratic South Africa, by arresting its leaders before the elections.
Using his powers under Proclamation R400, Matanzima ordered the
detention of Democratic leader Hector Ncokazi and twelve other top
party members in late July.53 At the time of independence in October;
5 The pact did not include a mutual defense agreement in the event of aggression
by a third party. However, in December 1975, Matanzima affirmed that any attack on
the Republic of South Africa would be considered an attack on Transkei. KEEsING'S
CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976, at 28061.
"The agreements are set out in Government Gazette No. 5320 (Oct. 20, 1976).
12The official figure was 65.95%, but an analysis appearing in the Rand Daily
Mail indicated that the official percentage was obtained by assuming a 100% poll for
the uncontested seats. If only the contested seats are taken into account, the figure is
•43.45%. KESSING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976, at 28062; RACE SURVEY,
supra note 30, at 244.
53RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 243.0
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thirteen executive members of the DP were in detention. 54 Without the
leadership of these men the opposition presented in the election was
not effective, and thus the TNIP mandate is subject to attack."5
A further indication of popular dissatisfaction with the in-
dependence of Transkei is shown by the large number of refugees
created by the secession /of the Hershel and Glen Gray districts to
Transkei. These areas were part of the Ciskei homeland, whose popu-
lation is also composed mainly of Xhosas, but were ceded to Transkei
in exchange for other territory in 1975.56 An earlier referendum in
1971 indicated that a large majority of the people in the district wished
the area to remain in Ciskei, and thus in South Africa, rather than
become a part of an independent Transkei. 7 Over 30,000 refugees left
Transkei at the time of independence," and the Ciskei government
fears that over 100,000 will flee altogether.5 9 While some of those leav-
ing Transkei, such as the Sotho-speaking refugees, sought to avoid liv-
ing in the Xhosa-dominated state, others acted on political and
economic grounds believing that their interests would be served best by
remaining citizens of South Africa.
Six of the eight other South African homelands refused to support
Transkeian independence. In a joint statement issued in August 1976,
the six said that they wanted "to reiterate that they have no intention
whatever of opting for so-called independence, as we do not want to
abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting our
share of the economy and wealth which we have jointly built.16 0
Typical was the response of Chief Buthelezi, head of the 4.3 million
Zulus and the largest homeland, KwaZulu, who emphatically denounced
Transkei's independence from South Africa. 61
"Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 5. See also id., June 12, 1976, at 1,
col. 7.
"'Many educated blacks in Transkei are critical of Matanzima's independence
policy. Joseph Kobo, a Democratic Party politician, claimed that 85% of the Trans-
keian population opposed independence. Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1976, at
7, col. 3.
S"These two blocks of territory are not contiguous to the main area of Transkei.
"Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 21, col. 3; RACE SURVEY, supra note 30,
at 245.
sWash. Post, Jan. 15, 1977, at A9, col. 6.
"Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 21, col. 3.
"Sunday Times (South Africa), Aug. 22, 1976, reprinted in RACE SURVEY, supra
note 30, at 247.
s'Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 30, 1976, at 4, col. 3. See also Buthelezi,
South Africa's Approaching Crisis, AFRICA REP., May-June 1976, at 2.
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The homeland of Lebowa first opposed independence for Transkei,
but later waivered on the issue. 62 Its leader indicated that the
homeland might be willing to accept independence itself if land
disputes with South Africa could be settled.6 3 Only Bophuthatswana
supported Transkei wholeheartedly and accepted the invitation to the
independence ceremonies." Bophuthatswana will follow the Transkeian
model and become independent on December 6, 1977.61
Most black leaders in South Africa have rejected separation of
Transkei from the Republic, viewing it as the ultimate step in the
apartheid policy of Pretoria. They question the economic viability of
the new state in light of its dependence on the South African economy,
contending that it will become little more than a reserve for cheap
labor for South African industry.6 6
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO INDEPENDENCE
Despite extensive efforts by both the South African and Transkeian
authorities to elicit support for the new state from the international
community, no state other than South Africa was officially represented
at Umtata on independence day and no other state has recognized
Transkei as an independent state.
In the months prior to independence Chief Matanzima and his
brother George Matanzima, the Transkeian Minister for Justice,
Police, and Prisons, made trips to Europe and to other African states
62Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 28, 1976, at 9, col. 3.
63RACE SURVEY, supra note 30, at 247.
"Johannesburg Star, Oct. 23, 1976, at 3, col. 6.
SsN.y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 6. Chief Lucas Mangope rejects the be-
lief that homeland independence should be opposed by South African blacks and the
world community as being against the interests of his people. "Nobody need sell us any
theories, never mind whether such salesmen are paid in rands, dollars or roubles. As if
we haven't got our own notions about what liberty is, or values, or what human living
is aboutl" S. AFR. PANORAMA, June 1977, at 19.
"See, e.g., the criticisms of John Gaetsewe, General Secretary of the South
African Congress of Trade Unions, South African Bantustans: How the So-Called In-
dependent Transkei Will Affect the African Workers, U.N., Dep't of Political and
S.C. Aff., Centre Against Apartheid, No. 28/76 (1976); C.F. Beyers Naude, Director
of the Christian Institute of South Africa, The Balkanization of South Africa,
AFRICA REP., May-June 1976, at 16; David Sibeko, Director of Foreign Affairs
of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), The Sham of Independence,
AFRICA REP., May-June 1976, at 14; and Oliver Tambo, Acting President of the
African Congress of South Africa, The Victory of Our Cause is Assured, U.N., Dep't of
Political and S.C. Aff., Centre Against Apartheid, No. 33/76 (1976), 7-8.
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in an attempt to win support and recognition for Transkei. 67 They
made an overture to the Organization of African Unity for member-
ship. 8 Transkei spent over $365,000 in the United States alone to gain
favor for its cause; its efforts included the hiring of a Madison Avenue
firm to handle the public relations campaign, junkets to Transkei for
Congressmen, and advertisements heralding independence which were
run in American newspapers and magazines.69
Transkeian leaders hoped that at least a few states, such as
Taiwan, Paraguay, Kenya, and Malawi (whose President has relatives
in Transkei), would extend recognition.70 In the end, not even Rho-
desia, perhaps the closest state to South Africa, attended the Trans-
keian independence ceremonies; South Africa alone sent representa-
tives." Nevertheless, foreign states indicated some interest as evidenced
by the presence of several dignitaries, including deputies from conser-
vative European parties, an American Senator, Taiwanese politicians,
and various Latin American VIP's.7 2
Nevertheless, it is evident that the international community has
almost universally rejected Transkeian independence, viewing it as a
sham and the culmination of South African apartheid policy. The
United Nations General Assembly has passed several resolutions con-
demning the homeland policy of the Nationalist government in
Pretoria. For example, in 1971 the Assembly denounced the Bantustan
policy as contrary to the principle of self-determination." s  In
8 Johannesburg Star, June 10, 1976, at 19, col. 1.
"Id., May 28, 1976, at 3, col. 1. The O.A.U. rejected Transkei's bid for accep-
tance, denouncing the Bantustan policy of South Africa as "the cornerstone of-Apart-
heid" in a resolution passed on June 28, 1976. O.A.U. Doc. CM/Res. 493 (XXVII),
reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1221 (1976).
"Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1. See also Johannesburg
Star, May 27, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
'°Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 17, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
"Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, at 29, col. 7. South Africa does not officially
recognize Rhodesia, but the countries maintain missions under an accredited
diplomatic representative in each other's capital, and South Africa may be considered
sympathetic to the Rhodesian government. On the relationship between South Africa
and Rhodesia in international law see Dugar, Rhodesia: Does South Africa Recognize
It As an Independent State?, 94 S. AFR. L.J. 127 (1977); Devine, The Status of
Rhodesia in International Law (Pt. 2), 1974 AcTA JURIDICA 109, 119-123.
"2The Times (London), Oct. 26, 1976, at 8, col. 5; Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26,
1976, at 29, col. 7.
"G.A. Res. 2775 E, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971).
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November 1975 it again condemned the establishment of the home-
lands and called upon the governments of its members not to deal with
institutions or authorities associated with the Bantustans or to
recognize them. 74 On Transkei's independence day the General
Assembly passed a similar resolution calling upon "all Governments to
deny any form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei
and to refrain from having any dealings with the so-called independent
Transkei or other bantustans." T The resolution was adopted by a vote
of 134 to 0, with the United States abstaining.76 The day before the
General Assembly resolution, and only hours before independence,
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim issued a statement expressing the
United Nations position on the independence of the homelands in-
dicating that South Africa must understand that the world would
never accept Transkei or the other homelands as separate political en-
tities.77 The Security Council endorsed this view as well as the General
Assembly resolution in a resolution of its own approved by consensus
on December 22, 1976.78 The nine members of the European
Economic Community announced on September 27, 1976, that they
would not recognize the new state, stating that "South Africa is a
multinational society in which all people, irrespective of their race or
color, should have the right to live peacefully together on the basis of
equality."7 9 The Nordic countries expressed similar feelings, refusing to
extend recognition to Transkei and rejecting the Bantustan policy. 80
14G.A. Res. 3411 D, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 37, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975).
"SG.A. Res. 31/6 A, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 10, U.N. Doc.
A/31/39 (1976).
76The United States defended its abstention on the grounds that the resolution
went beyond the nonrecognition of Transkei, and might hinder the protection of
American interests in Transkei. The U.S. also thought that only the Security Council
could impose the sanction of trade restraints on the state. U.N. CHRONICLE, Nov.
1976, at 14; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 5. See also the remarks of Secretary
Kissinger made at a Oct. 27, 1976 news conference, 75 DEPT STATE BULL. 640, 642
(1976). At the time of the U.N. resolution Kissinger was conducting negotiations with
Prime Minister Vorster, and thus an abstention was considered prudent policy. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1976, § IV, at 4, col. 2.
"For the text of the statement see U.N. CHRONICLE, Nov. 1976, at 14.
"S.C. Res. 402, 31 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).
"Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 30, 1976, at 4, col. 3. The EEC indicated that
it would not provide any economic aid for Transkei. KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES,
Nov. 26, 1976, at 28063.
80U.N. CHRONICLE, Nov. 1976, at 15.
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The Organization of African Unity decided in July 1976 that none of
its members should recognize an independent Transkei,81 affirming the
resolution of June 28th of its Council of Ministers. 82 The Conference of
Non-aligned Countries resolved not to recognize any of the South
African homelands."5 Pravda condemned the independence of Trans-
kei as a political bluff and asserted that the domestic and foreign
policy of Transkei would remain under the full control of South
Africa.8 4
The United States State Department acted cautiously in commit-
ting itself to a statement on recognition of Transkei, in part because of
negotiations then being conducted between Secretary Kissinger and
Prime Minister Vorster. The United States went on record as opposed
to independence just five days before the official ceremonies. 8 This
decision was forced in part by a resolution in the House of Representa-
tives calling for the President not to extent recognition to Transkei .6
Although the resolution was finally rejected, not having received the
necessary two-thirds vote, a substantial number of representatives did
support the measure. 8'
It is now appropriate to consider whether Transkei deserved this
overwhelming rejection by the international community both as a mat-
ter of international law and as a proper response to the South African
apartheid strategy.
STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nation-states are the primary subjects and actors in international
relations. It is therefore necessary to examine the legal criteria for
statehood in order to determine if Transkei and the other homelands
of South Africa exhibit sufficient attributes of a state to be accorded
recognition.
81KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976, at 28063.
82See note 68 supra.
"
5 Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries,
Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 1976, Res. NAC/CONF 5/S/RES 4, reprinted in U.N.,
Dep't of Political and S.C. Aff., Centre Against Apartheid, Notes & Documents, No.
23/76 (1976).
84 KEEsING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976, at 28063.
"Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 26, 1976, at 6, col. 3.
86H.R. Res. 1509, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1463,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). For Congressional debate on the issue, see 122 CONG.
REC. H10636-42 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
"
7The vote was 245 yea, 156 nay, and 29 not voting.
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Although there is no definitive international convention on the
criteria for statehood, there is a strong consensus among scholars and
jurists on the attributes of statehood. The traditional four re-
quirements are that the entity have: 1) A defined territory, 2) a
population, 3) a government with substantial control over the popula-
tion and territory, and 4) the capacity to engage in foreign relations."8
Legal writers have suggested other criteria, such as independence, wil-
lingness to observe international law, and a degree of permanence,"
but the traditional legal definition of a state has prevailed. 90 In fact,
the fourth criterion may well be superfluous since the ability to engage
in and meet international obligations is part of the effective control ex-
ercised by a government. Although the criteria purport to be objective,
measuring them is a process which necessarily involves political deci-
sions by the evaluating party.
In the case of Transkei, states have denied recognition, claiming
that the homeland failed to meet established criteria for statehood,
when in fact the response was based on moral and highly political
decisions concerning the policy of the Republic of South Africa, rather
than the characteristics of Transkei.9 ' Transkei satisfies the conditions
of statehood. The first two criteria are easily met: Transkei has a
definite territory and a permanent population. 92 Transkei's government
exercises effective control over the territory, with complete authority
over police, army, and judicial administration. South African law is:
applicable to Transkei only to the extent that the Transkeian legisla-
sSee, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 100 (1965); J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 137 (6th ed. 1963); 1 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-23 (1963).
89I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-81 (2d ed. 1973).
See J. FAWCETr, LAW OF NATIONS 38-39 (1968) for the suggestion that a government
of a state must be "good." But see Devine, The Requirements of Statehood Re-
Examined, 34 MOD. L. REv. 410 (1971).
90O'Brien & Goebbel, United States Recognition Policy Toward New Nations, in
3 THE YEARBOOK OF WORLD POLITY: W. O'BRIEN, THE NEW NATIONS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 105-06 (1965).
"
1For example, British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Anthony Crosland,
stated that Transkei did not "fulfil our well-established criteria for recognition as an
independent state." Quoted in KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976, at
28063. But see Preparatory Study Concerning A Draft Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of States (U.K. Comments), at 53, U.N., Int'l Law Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/2 (1948).
"The problem of the 1.3 million citizens of Transkei not resident in the territory
is discussed below.
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ture decides. Thus, the legal attributes of effectiveness and internal
supremacy are met. While it is true that the economy of Transkei is
tied to that of South Africa, with up to 80% of the state's $140 million
budget contributed by Pretoria, 93 this does not mean that Transkei
cannot follow an independent course in many respects. Many states are
economically dependent on others to some degree, yet manage to pur-
sue a separate foreign policy. Botswana is a good example of this prin-
ciple, for like Transkei it is strongly linked to the South African
economy, conducting the bulk of its trade with South Africa, which is
also a major source of jobs for its citizens. Still Botswana has shown in-
dependence in its foreign policy. 9 4 Lesotho is another example.9 5
Assuming that Transkei meets the requisites for statehood, the
question then becomes how should an entity that displays the at-
tributes of a state be treated by the international community. There
has been a longstanding controversy about recognition of states,
centered on two schools of thought. The constitutists believe that a
state becomes a legal entity under international law only through the
act of recognition by another state. 96 It is a positivist view of law, with
recognition creating the legal entity. A difficulty arises when this
theory is compared with actual state practice, for states are free to
recognize or refuse to recognize another state as they see fit. This
freedom creates a high degree of subjectivity in the recognition policies
of various states. A state such as Israel may be recognized by some
states but not by others. If recognition is considered constitutive, then
Israel exists and does not exist simultaneously as an international enti-
ty. Lauterpacht and others attempt to avoid this problem by imposing
a duty to recognize if the tests for independent statehood are met.
Recognition then becomes merely an objective legal function which
serves to identify the subjects of international law. 9 The opposing
declaratory school holds that recognition is merely the acknowledge-
ment of existing facts. 98 Once a territory satisfies the basic re-
9"N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1976, § IV, at 4, col. 2.
"Henderson, Independent Botswana: A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Options,
.73 AFR. AFr. 37 (1974).
""See note 126 infra.
9See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); 1
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-22 (5th ed. 1937); and Kelsen, Recognition
in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941).
91H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 96, at 32-33; 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 15-17 (1963).
98See T. CHEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION (1951); and J. BRIERLY,
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quirements it becomes a state and a member of the community of na-
tions. Recognition serves to establish legal relations between the new
state and the declaring state. Recognition is thus cognitive, not
creative. The practice of most states is in accord with the declaratory
theory, a natural law theory. International law imposes no duty upon a
state to recognize a new state, even when the new state meets the tests
of statehood, but instead allows a state to extend or withhold recogni-
tion as a matter of policy. This means that recognition will be a
political decision.99
This is the case with respect to nonrecognition of Transkei. In-
dividual states withheld recognition not on the basis of legal grounds,
though some alluded to such a decision, but rather on their political
interpretation of South African policies.10 0 The moral overtones of the
denial of recognition are even more evident when a group of states acts
in concert through a joint association.
COLLECTIVE NONRECOGNITION
Recognition is traditionally viewed as a function exercised by an in-
dividual state.'0 1 However, in the 20th century there has been a grow-
ing practice of groups of states acting together to protect a general in-
ternational policy rather than their own interests. Moral policy deter-
mines treatment of the unrecognized state. 10 2 Recognition is withheld
because it is believed that some "illegal" act has occurred. 0 3 The first
LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1963). The Montevideo Convention, signed by the United
States and 19 other American states, is an example of the declaratory view of recogni-
tion. Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
99See Kato, Recognition in International Law: Some Thoughts on Traditional
Theory, Attitudes of and Practices by African States, 10 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 299,
307-10 (1970).
10 For example, an editorial in the New York Times stated, "The reason for shun-
ning the Transkei is moral and political, rather than legal and juridicial." Oct.' 26,
1976, at 38, col. 2. George Ball makes the recommendation that the United States
avoid a display of moral superiority in dealing with South Africa, and not dismiss out
of hand the idea of separate territories. Asking for Trouble in South Africa, ATLAN-
TIC, Oct. 1977, at 50-51.
'
0 1H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 96, at 4.
'
0 2There is a growing practice of a group of nations acting together to protect a
general international policy rather than their own interests. Moral policy determines
the action. Note, The Doctrine of Recognition-A Case Note on Bilang v. Rigg, 7
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 477, 481 (1975).
'03H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 415-16 (2d ed. rev. 1966); 5
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 874-965 (1965).
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major application of this concept took place in 1932 with the develop-
ment of the Stimson doctrine. In response to the creation of the
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria the American
Secretary of State sent identical notes to Japan and China which ex-
plained the denial of recognition to the entity on the grounds that it
was contrary to the Kellog-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the
League of Nations. 0 4 The refusal to recognize would deny legitimacy
to the acts of aggression involved in the taking of the territory from
China. The League of Nations affirmed the Stimson Doctrine on the
basis of a commission report that Japanese officials were prominent in
the Manchukuo government, that there was little popular support for
the state, and that Japanese troops were present in the territory. 10 The
League Assembly resolved that its members "continue not to recognize
this regime either de jure or de facto. "106
The United Nations response to the Rhodesian unilateral declara-
tion of independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965 is a more recent ex-
ample of collective nonrecognition. °7 The General Assembly had
previously adopted a number of resolutions urging the members of the
United Nations not to accept the Rhodesian UDI. 0 1 After the fact, the
Security Council resolved that members not recognize the illegal
regime, thus making nonrecognition binding on the member states of
'04The Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition was embodied in two identical notes
sent to Japan and China. For the text of the notes see [1931-1941] 1 FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE U.S. 76 (1943) (special Japan volume); 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF IN.
TERNATIONAL LAW 874-75 (1965). See also Borchard, Recognition and Non-
Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (1942); McNair, The Stimson Doctrine and Non-
Recognition, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (1933).
'Report of the Commission of Inquiry, L.N. Doc. C.66.M320 (1932).
'06Draft Report of the Committee of Nineteen, at 21, L.N. Doc. A (Extra.) 22
(1933).
10'For analysis of the problems of recognition of Rhodesia see The Personality of
Unrecognized States in International Law: A Case Study on Rhodesia as an Illustra-
tion, in C. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
81-105 (1974); Cummings, The Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence and
the Position of the International Community, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 57 (1975);
Devine, The Status of Rhodesia in International Law (pts. 1-2), ACTA JURIDICA 1, 109
(1973-1974).
'"8See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2022, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 54, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965). Chief Matanzima once said that he would declare a UDI from South
Africa if the United Party ever gained power in the Parliament and opposed the in-
dependence of Transkei. Johannesburg Star, May 27, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
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the organization. 0 9 Later, economic sanctions were imposed by the
United Nations after the situation was characterized as a threat to
peace. Under Article 25 of the Charter these sanctions became binding
on the members.
A third example of the refusal of a collective body to grant
recognition to an entity purportedly created in violation of interna-
tional law is the case of Namibia. South Africa refused to release its
mandate from the League of Nations over South West Africa to the
United Nations for trusteeship. After General Assembly resolutions and
opinions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the mandate
had been terminated, the Security Council declared that the continued
presence of South African authorities in Namibia was illegal and ac-
tions taken by those authorities invalid." 0 All states were called upon
to refrain from dealing with South Africa in any manner inconsistent
with the resolution."' The ICJ later held that member states of the
United Nations were under an obligation to recognize the illegality and
invalidity of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia and to ab-
stain from entering into any economic dealings with the government of
South Africa or establishing any other relationship which might imply
recognition of the legality of its presence." 2
The use of nonrecognition in these cases has not proved to be an
effective tool of international law. Nor has the process of recognition
been divorced from the political decisions of individual states to fur-
ther their own self-interest. The world is still a long way off from the
treatment of recognition as an international responsibility." s As
Lauterpacht wrote several years ago:
We are not in a position to say either that there is a clear and
uniform practice of States in support of the legal view of recognition,
or that the process of recognition has invariably taken place, in all its
aspects, under the aegis of international law."1
While there may be a modest movement toward the acceptance of the
'0 S.C. Res. 217, 20 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Decs. 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/ Rev. 1
(1965).
"'0S.C. Res. 277, 25 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Decs. 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
11 ld.
"'Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 58.
"'Meeker, Recognition and the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83, 94 (1966).
"4H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 96, at 78.
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idea of collective nonrecognition as an authoritative decision of the in-
ternational community based on the even-handed application of legal
principles, such a practice is not imminent. The nonrecognition of
Manchukuo, Rhodesia, and the South African control over Namibia
had limited practicality. The realities of state practice undermine what
value there is in such moral posturing. The United Nations resolutions
on Transkei fit into this same pattern, although there is even less
justification for the collective response there.
The Stimson Doctrine failed as a legal device partly because of the
weakness of the world organization." 5 It was only after the defeat of
the Japanese in World War II, fourteen years after employment of the
doctrine, that the objective of the nonrecognition was achieved. Non-
recognition of Rhodesia has not deprived that state of an international
personality. Although the withholding of recognition of Rhodesia by
the United Nations may express that organization's view of the morali-
ty of the Smith regime, it cannot prevent the state from acting in in-
ternational affairs.1 1 6 South Africa's presence in Namibia continues.
The situation with respect to Transkei is unprecedented in interna-
tional law. The state came into existence through a purportedly con-
stitutional process, with full support of the parent state. This distin-
guishes Transkei from the cases of Manchukuo and Rhodesia. There
are no South Africans in authority in Transkei."' The reaction of the
United Nations in refusing to recognize the state is based on the
members' moral judgment of the internal policy of apartheid in South
Africa and not on the merits of Transkei's own government. Transkei
is firmly opposed to apartheid and, e.g., affirms the doctrine of racial
equality in its own territory." 8 Yet the members of the United Na-
tions, and in particular the black African states, can hardly point to
the record of their own state's practices as examples of the proper ex-
tension of human rights to all citizens.
Despite the nonrecognition accorded to its status as an independent
state, Transkei may well become an established actor in international
1P. JESsUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONs 162 (1946).
"'6See Kato, supra note 99, at 320-21.
"'During Transkei's self-governing stage there were some whites seconded by the
South African government in the Transkeian public service. In 1975, for example, 255
of the 10,291 government officials in Transkei were whites from South Africa. Back-
grounder, supra note 3, at 4.
118For example, in his independence day speech, Chief Matanzima warned South
Africa that homeland independence was not the solution to that state's internal prob-
lems. Johannesburg Star, Oct. 26, 1976, at 29, col. 3.
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affairs. Nonrecognition may deprive a state of full participation in in-
ternational relations, but it cannot deprive a state of all action. This is
particularly so when nonrecognition is not followed by subsequent ac-
tion by the nonrecognizing states." 9 Despite the united opposition of
many states to Rhodesia and its UDI, the Smith regime retains power
and continues to function in the world. The United Nations sanctions
have not produced the desired effect. If change comes to Rhodesia it
will come from within the state, for international law has proved an
unreliable tool for resolution of the problem. Once an entity has
established itself it carries with it the capacity to have contacts with
other governments, fully official or otherwise; isolation is impossible. 20
Transkei will no doubt make international contacts in the future.
States such as the Ivory Coast and Malawi have hinted at recognition.
Membership is possible in the South African Customs Union. Taiwan
has expressed an interest in investment in Transkei.12 ' Trading rela-
tions are sure to develop with other states. A state can come into being
without the recognition of other states. Such an unrecognized state
cannot be ignored completely in international law, for other states
have no right to violate the territory of an unrecognized state, or to
consider ships flying its flag as stateless. 22 State practice allows a state
that has the attributes of statehood, although unrecognized, the rights
and obligations accorded other states by international law. 12 3 Many
states do not recognize the German Democratic Republic, for example,
but that has not prevented it from belonging to international organiza-
tions and becoming a party to treaties.
Nonrecognition of Transkei will not be effective. It cannot keep
the territory from becoming a state under the international law
regardless of what theory of recognition is followed.
TRANSKEI'S CLAIM FOR SOVEREIGNTY
Transkei has a legitimate claim to sovereignty. It has a long ex-
"'Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 22) 65, U.N. Doc. A/10022 (1975).
20See Kato, supra note 99, for the thesis that recognition of statehood is losing
political importance as a doctrine.
12lSwiss bankers have indicated that they will provide assistance for Bophutha-
tswana's development after independence. S. AFR. PANORAMA, June 1977, at 19.
Similar aid for Transkei would appear to be a possibility.
t'C. OKEKE, supra note 107, at 104.
"'3RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
107 & 108 (1963).
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istence as a recognizable national entity. Cape Colony annexed Trans-
kei between 1879 and 1884; later in 1884 the Glen Gray Act provided
indirect rule over the territory under a system of local councils under a
district council. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 established a
General Council to govern Transkei in 1956, and in 1963 Transkei
became a self-governing homeland.
In addition to Transkei, other territories were annexed in South
Africa: Cape Colony annexed Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and
-Transvaal annexed Swaziland. When the Union of South Africa was
formed in 1910, these three territories became British protectorates;
but Cape Colony dragged Transkei into the Union. 12 4 The three pro-
tectorates eventually became independent states, welcomed by the
community of states and black Africa in particular: Botswana
(Bechuanaland) in 1966,125 Lesotho (Basutoland) in 1966, and Swazi-
land in 1968. Transkei, on the other hand, is now shunned because of
its sixty-six year forced association with South Africa. Even Lesotho,
with a similar history, culture, and economy, refuses to recognize
Transkei as an independent state. 126
Transkei does suffer some limitations on its independence because
of its tie to the South African economy, but it has potential for growth
and development greater than many other African states. Lesotho and
Swaziland are equally dependent on South Africa; Lesotho, for exam-
ple, conducts from 80 to 90% of its trade with the Republic. Transkei
possesses many advantages that these two states lack. While Lesotho
and Swaziland are landlocked, Transkei enjoys 270 miles of coastline
and a port of its own. The surface area of Transkei, which is about
the size of Belgium, exceeds that of twenty-two members of the United
Nations; its per capita income is higher than twenty-seven members.
Transkei is more highly developed than many African states, with
124See Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1976, at A23, col. 1.
12"When Botswana became independent Prime Minister Verwoerd sent a telegram
of congratulations to the new state, justifying its independence in terms of the Ban-
tustan model.
"26Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1976, at A23, col. 1. Lesotho appealed to the United Na-
tions for help in resisting South African pressure to recognize Transkei, which included
the closing of the common border. The Security Council adopted a resolution com-
mending Lesotho for its decision not to recognize Transkei and condemning the South
African action. Financial and technical aid to Lesotho was authorized. S.C. Res. 402,
31 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976). See also KEESING'S
CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, March 11, 1977, at 28244.
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growth potential in minerals and other resources. Future foreign in-
vestment is possible.
Moreover, Transkei can well pursue a foreign policy independent
of Pretoria. Botswana, in a similar situation, has exercised in-
dependence from South Africa despite its vulnerability.' 2 7 Lesotho,
although conservative in its foreign policy, maintains an opposition to
South Africa on apartheid and other matters. The very fact that
Lesotho refused to extend recognition to Transkei despite considerable
pressure from South Africa indicates the extent of that in-
dependence. 21
Transkeian independence from South Africa is further enhanced
by the fact that Pretoria actively encouraged the separation of the
homeland from the Republic. Thus it would be in an awkward posi-
tion after its efforts to legitimize the Transkeian state to reverse its
position and attempt to overtly control Umtata's policies. Even though
South Africa might not tolerate the active use of Transkei as a base for
guerrillas, Transkei still has substantial room to exercise control over
its foreign policy.
Chief Matanzima is not a puppet of Pretoria, but rather a Xhosa
nationalist who utilized South Africa's multinational development
policy to achieve his own ends of an independent Xhosa state. He does
not pretend that the South African policy is a solution to the racial
problems of that country. His rejection of Pan-Africanism in favor of
the narrower objective of Xhosa nationalism does not warrant the re-
jection of statehood for Transkei by the black African states. The
danger lies in confusing the merits of Transkeian independence with
the concern over South African internal policies. One can consistently
support the independence of the Xhosas without recognition of apart-
heid. Transkei must be judged on its own merits. The liberal Man-
chester Guardian, which stood almost alone in favoring recognition of
Transkei, argued that it was unfair to treat the state differently from
the other three protectorates. 129 "If each case is taken on its merits,
Transkei will be as much entitled to recognition as many a country
where people scrape a living within another's sphere of influence."'' 0
127Henderson, supra note 94.
"
8The Times (London), May 26, 1977, at 8, col. 8. For Lesotho's position in op-
posing homeland independence see its comments before the United Nations General
Assembly. 31 U.N. GAOR (29th plen. mtg.) 549-50, U.N. Doc. A/31/PV.29 (1976).
'29Editorial of Oct. 6, 1976, reprinted in Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1976, at A24, col.
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CITIZENSHIP IN TRANSKEI
The great majority of the citizens of Transkei actually residing in
the territory now probably favor the course that Chief Matanzima has
taken. The crux of the problem lies with the citizenship of the 1.3
million Xhosas living elsewhere who are being forced to become
citizens of Transkei. Pretoria is determined to deny these people their
South African citizenship despite the lack of direct ties between them
and the Transkei state. It is in this matter that international law and
the collective response of states can have some influence.
International law may come into play in two ways, depending on
how the Matanzima government decides to interpret the citizenship
provisions of its constitution."' If Transkei stands firm and refuses to
accept as nationals those blacks living outside Transkei who want to re-
tain their South African citizenship, the problem arises of the stateless-
ness of those persons. Under the South African Status of Transkei Act,
the urban blacks are deprived of their South African citizenship, and if
Transkei refuses to accept them as nationals, they may become
stateless.
The practice of international law generally allows a state to deter-
mine who its nationals will be.1' 2 At present there is no general rule in
international law that the deprivation of citizenship is illegal."13 Even
mass denationalization is not prohibited."14 For example, during World
War II Germany deprived Jews of their nationality, but however im-
moral this was, international law provided no remedy.' Thus, South
Africa's denationalization may not be condemned on grounds that it
was illegal according to the present structure of international law.
There is, however, a tendency to deduce a rule disallowing dena-
tionalization from the concept of human rights.1 6 This idea has been
embodied in several international agreements. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General
3 See note 36 supra.
132 D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 370 (2d ed. 1976); I. BROWNLIE, supra note
89, at 367. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality
Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, arts. I & 2.
"13I. BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 391.
148 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1967). Some tribunals
have on occasion stated that international law does not permit compulsory change of
nationality. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 89, at 392.
'I3 D. GREIG, supra note 132, at 385.
1862 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 684 n.63 (2d ed. 1970).
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Assembly in 1948, provides in Article 15, paragraph 2: "No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to,
change his nationality.'1 37 In 1961 the United Nations concluded the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 38 which prohibited in
principle the deprivation of nationality. Article 9 of the Convention ex-
pressly provides that a state may not deprive a person of nationality on
the basis of racial or ethnic grounds.13 9 South Africa's deprivation of
citizenship to those urban blacks who are "associated" with Transkei in
some form, can be attacked under this human rights approach, albeit
an inchoate rule in international law. So in international affairs
foreign states could simply treat these stateless persons as South
African citizens.
If Transkei chooses to accept the urban blacks as nationals against
their own desires to remain South Africans, then such action may be
attacked under the "genuine link" doctrine. The principle was ar-
ticulated in the Nottebohm case.140 There the ICJ noted that for inter-
nal matters international law places few restrictions on the extent to
which a state may extend (or withdraw) its nationality. But if the na-
tionalization is to be effective in international affairs then it must con-
form to certain principles."' In the international plane "a State cannot
claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by
another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of
making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's
genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of its
citizens by means of protection against other States."1
42
In establishing an effective link to the state the law will look to
such factors- as habitual residence, center of interest, family ties, and
attachment to the state.14" On this basis Transkei's purported
sovereignty over the urban blacks is subject to challenge because in
many cases there is no genuine link between these people and Trans-
"
37G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948). The Declaration is not legally
binding on the signatory states.
'
98U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 9/15, opened for signature Aug. 30, 1961. Note especially
art. 8. See also Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, done Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
"Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 138, art. 9.
.'4[1955] I.C.J. 4 (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala).
14D. GREIG, supra note 132, at 320.
'1[1955] I.C.J. 4, 23.
"'Id. at 22.
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kei. Many have lived outside of Transkei their entire lives, and have no
family ties to the state.
44
THE OTHER HOMELANDS
Transkei's right to recognition as an independent state does not im-
ply that the other homelands deserve the same treatment. Each case
must be judged on its merits. Fragmentation of the homelands poses
one of the major obstacles to the viability of independent states.
Transkei consists of three blocks of land, but Bophuthatswana,
,scheduled to become independent in December 1977, will have eight
pieces of territory. KwaZulu will have ten parts.if the 1973 consolida-
tion plan is carried out." 5 Unless effective consolidation is accomplished,
the smaller, fragmented homelands will experience little success as
separate international entities. 46 Except for Transkei, the homelands
are effectively landlocked, since even those with a coastline have
landlocked blocks of territory; they are wholly surrounded by the
Republic of South Africa. None but Transkei possesses a port.
The areas- designated for homeland development account for only
13.8% of the total area of South Africa, yet Pretoria intends to assign
80% of the population to these blocks of land for citizenship purposes.
In many cases the lands do not correspond to the traditional territory
of the Bantu peoples." 47 The areas set aside in 1936 for the blacks
under the Native and Trust Land Act were not intended to provide
the basis for independent states. Thus a large percentage of the de
1"Chief Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland and an opponent of
Transkei's independence, disclosed in 1976 that he would bring the matter of Transkei
citizenship to the attention of the O.A.U. and ask it to seek the opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, if necessary. KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES, Nov. 26, 1976,
at 28062.
14The Rand Daily Mail commenting on the consolidation of KwaZulu wrote on
May 16, 1975:
The present 48 separated areas will be reduced to 10 still-separated bits and
pieces. How in heaven's name is such a patchwork quilt to govern itself? Will
there be dozens of border posts manned by countless officials to allow for
people travelling from one chunk of land to another? What sort of army-to-
be will KwaZulu need to defend itself against possible attack? What about
water supplies? Telegraph lines? Rail lines?
Quoted in Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 22) 66, U.N. Doc. A/10022 (1975).
'4"See SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, May 14, 1975, at col. 5926
(statement of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development).
'41A. LEMON, APARTHEID 203 (1976).
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jure population of the homelands lives outside the territory of citizen-
ship. In the extreme case of the South Sotho homeland, only 1.7% of
the 452,000 people actually live on the land area designated as their
place of citizenship. Some of these homelands will not opt for in-
dependence, but will elect to remain in South Africa and pursue their
interests as part of that state. Those that do desire independence must
be judged by the principles of self-determination and fairness accorded
to other black African states by the international community.
CONCLUSION
Transkei was dragged into the South African Union in 1910
without being given a choice. It has maintained a separate identity
from that time. The Xhosa people should be allowed to assert their
own national identity, and the argument for maintenance of the ter-
ritorial integrity of South Africa should not be permitted to frustrate
Xhosa self-determination to form an independent state.
To speak of a single "indivisible" nation, and to speak of "territorial
integrity" as of paramount importance in countries where loyalties
are fluid and national unity may not in fact exist-this is to let
rhetoric obscure reality. If governments increasingly depend on the
consent of the governed for their power just or not, so nations in-
creasingly depend on the same consent for their cohesion. 4 8
Rather than view the process of independence for the Xhosas in South
Africa as the balkanization of Africa, it can be seen as the Scandina-
vianization of the Bantu people.
14 9
The nonrecognition of Transkei will serve only to force Umtata
closer to Pretoria and retard the cause of freedom in South Africa. If
instead of shunning the new state, black Africa welcomed it and ad-
mitted it to the Organization of African Unity and sponsored member-
ship in the United Nations, South Africa might well be hoisted by its
own petard. Transkei could serve as a base for the liberation move-
ment in South Africa from which the apartheid policies of the Na-
tional Party could be attacked. The Republic would find itself in the
148K. DEUTScH, Forward to NATION BUILDING at ix, (K. Deutsch & W. Foltz eds.
1963).
4 9Joseph S. Nye, Jr. observes that "Pan-Africanists stress the dangers of
'Balkanization,' with its connotations of poverty and dependence, never the possibilities
of 'Scandinavianization,' with its implied prosperity and independence." Quoted in
Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Order: Community Response to Territorial
Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779, 845 n.315 (1976).
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embarrassing position of having fostered the independence of the state
only to have it become a thorn in its side. The Kenya Daily Nation ex-
pressed this idea by commenting, "If Mr Matanzima is genuine about
his interest in liberation organisations, the African homelands in South
Africa may yet prove to be the Trojan horse that will contribute to the
undoing of the South African Whites." '
There is strong evidence that Transkeian officials do intend to op-
pose South African policy within the limits of their situation. Tsepo L.
Letlaka, a former activist in the Pan Africanist Congress of South
Africa, and now a member of the Transkeian cabinet, took this view of
Transkei's role in the liberation movement.
The Transkei's decision to become a sovereign, independent state in-
troduces an altogether new factor in national and international
debates on the struggle between Black and White in South Africa.
An important section of the victims of apartheid is going to speak to
the world on the race issue. . . .They will speak as equals, and will
look the White oppressors in the eye. They will speak not as ad-
vocates or partisans, but as people involved directly in the clash be-
tween Black and White in South Africa. Whether or not the outside
world likes it, the Transkei state will be able to speak on apartheid
with an authority no self-appointed body or nation outside possesses
today. Independence will maximize the effectiveness of Transkei as
chief spokesman of the oppressed of South Africa.151
These are not the words of a puppet.
DONALD A. HEYDT*
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1978.
150 Quoted in Johannesburg Star, Oct. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
15 From an address given at the California Institute of Technology, quoted in
Hahn, What Should the U.S. Do?, AnR. REPORT, May-June 1976, at 10.
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